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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's action "failed", within the meaning of U.C.*A. §7812-40 (1953), when the trial court actually dismissed the case, not
when the time to issue process or complete service expired.

This

is how prior Utah cases have calculated the one year re-filing
period.

Because a dismissal for failure to obtain service or issue

process is not a dismissal on the merits, Plaintiff's action should
have been dismissed without prejudice.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PRIOR APPELLATE DECISIONS HAVE CALCULATED
THE ONE YEAR RE-FILING PERIOD FROM THE
DATE OF WRITTEN DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION
A.

Standard Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn v. Kirkbride:
Plaintiff pointed out in his opening brief that Utah appellate

courts have assumed that the one-year re-filing period runs from
the date of an order dismissing the case, not from the date when
service should have been completed. For instance, in Standard Fed.
Sav. and Loan Assn. v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991), a
property was foreclosed upon on March 8, 1987.

A complaint for a

deficiency judgment was filed on June 8, 1987, within the three

1

month limit.
not.

Summons needed to be issued within 120 days/ but was

When it was not, the action was dismissed by written order of

the trial court on May 2, 1988.
The plaintiff re-filed on March 13, 1989, which was less than
one-year from the date of written dismissal, but more than one year
from the time when the summons should have been issued, which would
have been October, 1987. If the one year re-filing period ran from
the last day when summons could have issued, then the bank in
Standard Federal was untimely in re-filing its action.

However,

the parties, the trial court, and the Utah Supreme Court

all

calculated the one-year ran from the date when the order to dismiss
was entered; not from the date when the summons should have been
issued.

Thus, the

re-filing

was

timely,

and

the

action

was

remanded for further proceedings.
Importantly, the Standard Federal lawsuit was governed by the
same rules regarding issuance or service of summons as this action.
The date of filing the first Standard Federal action actually predated the filing of this action by eight months. The same language
of Rule 4 would have been applicable to both Standard Federal, and
this action.

It seems that this should be three months, instead of 120
days, given the date of filing the complaint, and the fact that the
120 day service limit did not come into effect until 1989.
2

B.

Moffitt v. Barr:
The Court of Appeals dealt with a similar situation in the

case of Moffitt v. Barr, 181 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).

In Moffitt, the plaintiff's action for assault and battery

arose on November, 1984. He filed a complaint in February, 1985,
but this action was not properly served within one year, and was
dismissed on December 1, 1986.2 Less than one-year after that, the
action was re-filed, on November 7, 1987.
The Court of Appeals calculated the one year re-filing period
from the date the written order was entered, or December 1, 1986.
If Defendant's theory were correct, the time for service of the
first complaint would have been not later than March 1, 1986. At
that point, the complaint would be automatically dismissed, and the
one year

re-filing

period

would

begin.

Accordingly,

under

Defendant's theory, the second action would have needed to be filed
by March 1, 1987.
1987.

Actually, it was not filed until November 7,

Again, it was obvious to the Court of Appeals, and both

parties, that the one year re-filing period began, not upon the
2

Moffitt noted that service was defective, but wondered why
the complaint was dismissed, instead of service being quashed.
Rule 4(b) required that a complaint which was not properly served
within one year be dismissed. While improper service could have
been quashed, that would not have resulted in the complaint being
dismissed, unless one year had also passed since filing the
complaint. This is what happened, given the dates set forth in the
opinion. Thus, the trial court in Moffitt properly dismissed the
complaint instead of simply quashing service.
3

expiration of the time for service, but upon entry of a written
order for dismissal.

Again, Moffitt was governed by the same

provisions of Rule 4(b) as in the instant case.
C.

Moffitt and Standard Federal Are Not Distinguishable:
Defendant attempts to distinguish Moffitt v. Barr, 181 Utah

Adv. Rpt. 71 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and Standard Fed. Sav. and Loan
Assn. v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991) by claiming that they
did not involve the application of Rule 4(b). This is misleading;
both cases directly involved the application of the savings statute
in situations where a case was first dismissed under Rule 4(b) for
failure to issue or serve the summons.

Both Moffit and Standard

Federal calculated the one year re-filing period to run from the
date of dismissal by written order of the court, not from when Rule
4(b) required service.

If Defendant were correct, neither re-

filing would have been timely.

In both these cases, it seemed

obvious to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Utah Supreme Court,
counsel for all parties, and two trial courts, that the re-filing
period ran from the issuance of a written order of dismissal.

3

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), while not
involving Rule 4(b), is support by analogy.
4

POINT II
THERE ARE NO LEGITIMATE REASONS WHY RULE 4(b)
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO OVERRIDE RULE 41
A. No Prior Appellate Decision Has Allowed Rule 4(b) to Rewrite
Rule 41,
Defendant admits that Rule 41 requires a written order for
dismissal.

Instead, he simply asserts that Rule 41 is overridden

by Rule 4(b).

He offers no policy arguments or legal reasons why

Rule 4(b) should rewrite Rule 41.

Defendant's sole basis for

insisting that Rule 4(b) overrides Rule 41 is to cite Cook v.
Starkey, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976), Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970) , Dennett v.
Powers, 536 P.2d 135 (Utah 1975), and Valley Asphalt Inc. v. Eldon
J. Stubbs Const., Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986).

However, none

of these cases cited by Defendant discuss how or when an action
"will be deemed dismissed".

None of them suggest that the

dismissal operates by operation of law, without written order of
the court. Most importantly, none of these cases discuss when an
action which "will be deemed dismissed" under Rule 4(b) actually
"fails" for purposes of the savings statute, U.C.A. §78-12-40
(1953).
Actually, Fibreboard simply held that a trial court was
correct in setting aside a default judgment where the summons was
not timely issued.

It did not say that the action rendered the
5

complaint a nullity.

Presumably, the Fibreboard plaintiff had one

year to serve process, measured from the date of affirmance by the
Supreme Court.

Dennett's holding was no broader, merely affirming

a dismissal for failure to timely serve summons. Cook decided only
that an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint
for purposes of service of process.

And Defendant admits that

Valley Asphalt dealt with another provision of Rule 4 relating to
serving other defendants at a later date.
Defendant argues that a phrase found in Dennett and Valley
Asphalt, "is deemed dismissed", is broader than Rule 4(b), which
merely states that a complaint "will be deemed dismissed".

If, in

fact, Cook, Fibreboard, Dennett and Valley Asphalt intended to
create a gloss on Rule 4(b) whereby a complaint became a nullity by
operation of law, it created that gloss without any explanation or
reasoning to support it.

Such a gloss would run counter to the

express provisions of Rule 41 regarding dismissals, as well as Rule
12(h) regarding waiver of defenses arising from defective service.
B.

Policy Reasons Why Rule 41 Governs All Dismissals
Defendant

argues

that

"Fibreboard

and

Dennett

must

be

interpreted to mean that failure to [timely issue or serve summons]
renders the complaint itself a nullity."

Respondent's Brief at 9-

10. Why "must" they be interpreted in that way?

Cook, Fibreboard,

Dennett and Valley Asphalt appear to simply restate the language of
6

Rule 4.

The use of the phrase "is deemed dismissed" by the Court

in Valley Asphalt should not be expanded to mean that the complaint
itself is a nullity, expiring by operation of law without further
action of the court.

Rule 4(b) does not mandate such a result.

There is no legitimate reason why such a result must, or even
should follow from Rule 4(b).
The only reason Defendant can proffer to this Court why Rule
4(b) is an exception to Rule 41, is that it prevents "litigation of
stale claims."

Respondent's Brief at 14-15.

However, Defendant's

theory could bar claims as soon as one year and three months after
the cause of action arose, assuming a promptly filed lawsuit, with
a failure to issue summons within three months.

There is actually

little relationship between Rule 4(b) and litigation
claims.

of

stale

In any event, the Legislature surely balanced the need to

bar stale claims against the need to protect litigants' rights to
a decision on the merits when it passed U.C.A. §78-12-40.
The injustice that could result if Rule 4(b) were construed to
automatically
demonstrated

dismiss
by this

complaints
action.

without

a

As happened

written

order

is

here, a defect

in

issuance or service of the summons may be raised more than one year
after it occurs.
have run.

In the meantime, the statute of limitations may

The defect may be due to a faulty return of service, by

misrepresentation

of an agent purporting

7

to accept

or receive

process,

by

a

false

return

of

service,

plaintiff, or through simple inadvertence

by

inaction

of counsel.

of

the

In the

instant case, Defendant has admitted that at least part of the
explanation for the delay in service was because he moved out of
state.4
On

(R. 162-163).
the

other

purposefully

delay

hand,
filing

an

improperly

a motion

to

served
set

defendant

aside

a

might

defective

judgment, in order to let the one year re-filing time run.

A

defendant may delay answering the complaint, raise dilatory motions
under Rule 12, or may purposefully draw attention away from the
defect by engaging in discovery until one year has run from the
date when process should have been issued or served.

In sum, the

plaintiff may be completely blameless for the defect, and may even
be

the

victim

of

another's misconduct.

If the

Defendant

is

correct, a plaintiff may never know there is a problem regarding
service until after the time to re-file has passed.

Was Rule 4(b)

intended to create such a trap?
CONCLUSION
Rule 41 governs; this action will not be dismissed until this
Court affirms.

Prior cases in both the Court of Appeals and the

Supreme Court have assumed this, and have acted accordingly.

4

The

Prior Rule 4(b) apparently did not contain any provision
for extending the time for service.

8

cases cited by Defendant do not even discuss Rule 41 or the savings
statute.
should

be

Defendant's argument is hyper-technical and unfair, and
rejected.

The

trial

court's

dismissal

should

affirmed, without prejudice.
DATED this / / day of January, 1993.
/

Daniel F. Bertch
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100
West Valley City, UT 84120
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

9

be
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